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Darren Kew and David L. Phillips
Oil, Natural Gas,
and Other Vital
Resources
Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region has seen little benefit from the
billions of dollars earned from oil over the last four decades,
prompting a growing but disorganized insurgency across the re-
gion. Irresponsible oil companies and government officials have
reduced the Niger Delta to one of the most polluted environments
on earth. Corrupt local and national politicians, many of whom
came to power through rigged elections, have colluded to manipu-
late ethnic divisions amid poverty to loot the region’s wealth.
Consequently, the people of the Niger Delta have no formal politi-
cal voice in Nigeria’s nascent democratic system, increasing the
appeal of militias as alternatives for political influence and eco-
nomic sustenance. A new Nigerian president takes office in May
2007, and he will likely have a brief window of opportunity to
undertake measures to reverse the governance crisis in the Niger
Delta.
The beleaguered Niger Delta region is the nation at its extremes: Atonce, it embodies both tremendous economic potential — earning
Nigeria $45 billion in 2005 alone — and the bitter betrayal of its people by
its political elite. Nigeria has earned over $300 billion since 1970 from
Niger Delta oil, yet the region still shows little sign of economic develop-
ment. Indeed, oil production has created an environmental disaster there,
killing off local fish populations, polluting drinking water, and exacerbating
poverty conditions.
Brazenly rigged elections across the region in 1999 and 2003 have
rendered the people of the Niger Delta voiceless in all levels of the Nigerian
government, while powerful politicians and their clients build increasingly
armed camps to fight battles over who gets to steal more from the public
coffers. Left with no alternatives, the region’s youth turn to militias for
respect and economic sustenance, while mainstream community leaders
155
ponder more radical solutions to the crisis. As one activist commented, “the
militias know that the only language that this government listens to is
violence.”1
With another flawed election looming in 2007 — all signs point to an
election that will be as rigged as were its predecessors — groups across the
Niger Delta are mobilizing. Political factions are fighting for control of local
turf and jostling for position in negotiations with the ruling Peoples Demo-
cratic Party (PDP) and leading opposition parties. Amid constant rumors
that President Obasanjo’s supporters are scheming to provoke systemic
emergencies that will provide him sufficient excuses to delay or annul the
elections, forces across the Niger Delta are poised to respond violently to
such a conspiracy, which could precipitate a serious national crisis.
Resolving the crisis in the Niger Delta requires a host of solutions as
complex as the many communities that reside in the region. Yet the many
facets of the conflicts share a common thread: neither the Nigerian govern-
ment nor the multinational oil companies are talking in a comprehensive,
systematic fashion with the communities who are affected by their actions.
The president or governors meet on occasion with key militia leaders in
response to hostage taking or outbreaks of violence, and individual oil
companies negotiate with individual community leaders on occasion, but
neither government nor business is working in a region-wide, participatory
fashion.
Remedies are required by the Nigerian government, opposition forces,
civil society groups, oil corporations, and international actors in the Niger
Delta. Stakeholders should support measures to reverse the governance
crisis in the oil-producing region by holding credible elections, respecting
political opposition, and disarming the militias. In order to achieve these,
the Nigerian government must open a serious public dialogue process that
addresses the fundamental governance crisis in the region and builds confi-
dence among the many communities of the Niger Delta that the democratic
system can meet their legitimate needs for socioeconomic development.
A History of Exploitation
The concentration of Nigeria’s massive oil wealth in the Niger Delta has
caused Delta residents to suffer inordinately the nation’s overall governance
failures. Despite the windfall of oil revenues over the last thirty-six years,
the Nigerian standard of living is worse than in the 1960s. The World Bank
estimates that 92.4 percent of Nigerians in 2006 are living on less than $2
per day,2 and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Develop-
ment laments that “Nigeria has some of the worst social indicators in the
world.”3
Nowhere has this suffering been more evident than in the Niger Delta.
Despite providing nearly three-quarters of government revenues and
roughly 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings, the region’s vast oil
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reserves have not resulted in socioeconomic development. Bayelsa state, for
instance, has only one multilane, paved road, which leads only as far as the
capital — most of its riverine areas remain unconnected either to national
transportation networks or to electricity grids. Many of the schools or
hospitals that have been built in the Niger Delta in recent years — usually
by the oil companies themselves — have inadequate staff, equipment, and
supplies.
The Niger Delta region includes six states (adjacent portions of three
additional states are often included in some counts) of which Bayelsa,
Rivers, and Delta states produce the most oil and have the most significant
problems. The region is a maze of creeks, streams, and swamps formed by
the Niger River as it divides into six main tidal channels before spilling out
into the Atlantic Ocean. Before oil was discovered, the Niger Delta region
had the most extensive lowland tropical and fresh water forests, aquatic
ecosystems, and biodiversity in West Africa. Residents cultivated rice,
sugarcane, plantain, palm oil, yams, cassava, and timber.4 At least seven
million Ijaw, Ogoni, Itsekiri, Andoni, Ibibio, and a host of other peoples
speaking distinct languages live in Bayelsa, Rivers, and Delta states alone.
Oil Windfall
Nigeria has roughly 40 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The oil is of
low sulfur content — so-called “sweet” crude — and much sought after by
refineries in the United States, which purchases about 40 percent of current
production. Nigeria provides about 11 percent of American oil imports —
the fifth largest source. Today, Nigeria has the capacity to produce about
2.4 million barrels of oil per day, and is projected to reach 4 million barrels
per day by 2010.5 In addition, Nigeria is home to the world’s seventh largest
supply of natural gas.6
Nigeria’s military governments centralized control of the oil industry
under the presidency. The 1999 Constitution, which vests predominant
powers in the executive branch, places the president in a commanding
position over Nigerian political and economic life. Nigeria’s President
Olusegun Obasanjo also served as oil minister for over seven of his eight
years in office, which restricted public scrutiny of the oil sector.7 The Niger
Delta was hit particularly hard by the 1969 Oil Revenue Act, which trans-
ferred all energy earnings to the federal government. This was compounded
by the 1978 Land Use Act, which made the Federal Government the osten-
sible owner of all land, and which the government applies in practice far
more than provisions of the 1999 Constitution that established the indi-
vidual right to own land. The constitution does, however, insist that 13
percent of oil revenues be returned to the oil-producing states (in addition to
their share of federal revenues given to all thirty-six states).
Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Agip, Elf, and Texaco are major partners with the
Nigerian National Petroleum Company, which retains 55–60 percent of
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earnings from joint ventures and then heavily taxes the remaining profits of
the oil companies. Nigerian and international human rights groups have
criticized these companies for their environmental practices in the Niger
Delta and for their assistance of the Nigerian military and its heavy-handed
tactics.8 Consequently, kidnapings of Nigerian and foreign oil workers have
increased in recent years.
At the urging of the United Kingdom, the Obasanjo administration
developed the Nigerian Extractive Industries Initiative (NEITI), and has
pushed oil companies active in Nigeria to join. The NEITI holds companies
and the government to a series of rights standards and best practices, and
promises to conduct regular audits of the industry. Such audits are impor-
tant, as they would provide the Nigerian public with its first ever glimpse at
the real revenue figures earned by the oil industry and paid to the Nigerian
government. NEITI’s first audit was held in 2005, and in early 2006 the
Obasanjo administration revealed significant discrepancies between what
the oil companies paid and what the government recorded as its earnings.
Massive Corruption
The NEITI revelation of “discrepancies” is only the tip of the iceberg.
Pervasive, systematic corruption at the heart of Nigerian politics is part of a
pattern of political behavior known as neopatrimonialism, or the so-called
“Big Man” or godfather phenomenon, in which powerful individuals capi-
talize on political and economic centralization to develop strong, hierarchi-
cal loyalty networks. These pyramid-structured networks are fueled by
patronage sourced both legitimately and illegally from government coffers:
“The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of
personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in
society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for mate-
rial rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions up-
ward as a mark of deference to patrons.”9
As one Nigerian political analyst remarked, “No self-respecting Nigerian
politician is without illegitimate business interests in Niger Delta oil.”10 “Big
Men” from across the nation have sought to build their political empires on
oil from the Niger Delta, either indirectly through access to federal and
state government shares of the earnings, or directly through legitimate
business interests in the region or, more typically, via oil smuggling and
other criminal activities.
Although half of all public revenues are taken by the federal government,
the state governments have their share, which is roughly a quarter. The
constitution stipulates, however, that before the oil revenues are divided
among the federal government, the thirty-six state governments, and the
nation’s 774 local governments, the oil-producing states must receive a first
cut of 13 percent of the total oil revenues in addition to their roughly 1/36th
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share of the allocations to all the states. The Niger Delta state governments
have received fabulous returns since global oil prices jumped in 2003.
Table 1 demonstrates that the state governments of the Niger Delta,
particularly the conflict-ridden states of Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta, have
received a fantastic amount of revenue every month. When local tax re-
ceipts are included, Rivers state will likely earn over US$1.2 billion for 2006
— over four times what Lagos state, arguably Nigeria’s most populous,
earned. The Obasanjo administration also created a special Niger Delta
Development Commission (NDDC) in 1999, which has received 210 billion
naira (US$1.62 billion) over the last six years to undertake development
projects in the region.
Table 1
Monthly Federal Allocations for July 2006 for the Niger Delta11
Akwa
Ibom
Bayelsa
Cross
River
Delta
Edo
Rivers
Lagos
(non-Niger
Delta State)
All of the state allocations go directly to the control of the governor. The
local government allocations for each state are also given directly to the
governor from the federation account. Governors are then supposed to
distribute funds to each local government in their state. Rivers state, for
instance, received 1.56 billion naira (US$12 million) for the month of July
2006 for its local governments. In practice, however, governors frequently
withhold large portions of  allocations for predetermined expenses such as
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State Statutory
Allocation
(in billions
of Naria)
Share of
13%
Deviation
(in billions of
Naria)
Total for
July
(in billions
of Naira)
US Dollar
Value*
(in millions
of Dollars)
Annual
projection
July X 12
(in millions
of Dollars)
6.17
7.49
2.04
6.68
2.02
9.69
2.82
4.43
6.13
4.02
4.89
2.75
7.66
0
1.74
1.36
1.64
1.79
1.75
2.03
2.82
$47.5
$57.6
$15.7
$51.4
$15.5
$74.5
$21.7
$569.5
$691.2
$188.3
$616.6
$186.5
$894.0
$260.4
* N 130 = $1
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education. Some of these funds get lost in the state government bureau-
cracy, or in questionable construction and other projects that are awarded
to gubernatorial allies who may never start or complete them. State gover-
nors also have important roles in the management of NDDC funds, for
which there is little to show.
Consequently, even with the federal government withholding the lion’s
share of oil wealth, the state governments of the Niger Delta are flush with
sufficient funds to make significant impact on socioeconomic development in
the region. Community leaders and civil society activists across the Niger
Delta point to one clear explanation for why this wealth has not translated
into regional progress: massive corruption on the parts of state governors,
their supporters, and federal officials. The recently impeached and jailed
governor of Bayelsa state, for instance, owned several multimillion dollar
properties in the United Kingdom, as well seven British bank accounts, and
a yacht, all sourced from public funds. The Rivers state governor bought
two private jets, a helicopter, and a host of private properties. Rivers state
in its 2006 budget set aside US$3.6 million for gifts and souvenirs for guber-
natorial visitors alone.12 Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commis-
sion (EFCC) is investigating all six Niger Delta governors.13
Under growing pressure, and looking toward his bid for the presidency,
the Rivers state governor announced in early 2006 that he was giving
US$20 million (about a quarter of what the state earns in a single month)
for a new Rivers State Sustainable Development Program, with technical
assistance but no funding from USAID and other major donors. Bayelsa
state has pledged a similar initiative. Little of the promised funds have,
however, so far been delivered in Rivers state.
Oil Spills and Flares
While the politicians find personal bonanzas at the public’s expense, health
and environmental conditions in the Niger Delta continue to worsen at an
alarming rate. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that over 4000 oil
spills have occurred in the Niger Delta since 1960, which have discharged
over two million barrels of crude into the environment.14 A recent report
from environmental NGOs put that number far higher, saying that 1.5
million tons of oil has spilled into the Niger Delta over the past fifty years,
making the region one of the five most polluted locations on earth.15 Oil
slicks cover the region; blowouts and leaks affect creeks, streams, and
related traditional sources of livelihood, destroying mangrove forests,
eroding soil plots, and killing aqua life. Hundreds of well-sites have flares,
which come from the burning of associated gas. The flares heat up every-
thing nearby and turn night into day, releasing 5 million tons of CO2 and 12
million tons of methane annually.16 Resulting sulfuric acid mists damage
plants and forests. Flares pollute rainwater, cause acid rain, and contribute
to climate change.17
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Amid this pollution, many Niger Delta residents suffer from oil poisoning.
Crude oil enters the body through skin absorption, ingestion of food and
water, and inhalation of oil and dust particles. Oil poisoning causes respira-
tory ailments. In addition, residents suffer from a plethora of waterborne
diseases such as malaria, dysentery, tuberculosis, typhoid, and cholera. Life
expectancy is low and child morbidity rates are sky-high.18 With population
growing at a rate of 3 percent annually and unemployment at 90 percent,
impoverished and hopeless youths are migrating from their villages to Port
Harcourt and other urban areas. The Niger Delta has the highest incidence
of HIV/AIDS in Nigeria; prostitution and teenage pregnancies are on the
rise. There is also a spiral of cults, gangs, robbery, and spontaneous vio-
lence.19
Militancy
Abysmal living conditions in the face of spectacular oil wealth has caused a
growing number of individuals in the Niger Delta to see violence as a
solution to their problems. Many armed groups were nurtured and em-
ployed by politicians, including some governors, to help rig the 2003 elec-
tions. Most of the militias remain under the influence of the political elites,
but some are growing increasingly autonomous and have moved into
bargaining relationships with their “godfathers” and other elite actors.
Militias live off political patronage and the security services they offer to
protect oil bunkering (stealing) operations, as well as ransom money gained
from kidnapping foreign oil workers. A 2004 government amnesty and
weapons buyback from the militias was brokered by civil society actors, but
the Obasanjo administration allowed the program to lapse within six
months and the militias have rearmed with even more sophisticated weap-
onry.
The emergence of militias is primarily a result of wide unemployment and
general political frustration with the poor state of development in the
region. “Most of the groups are formed as a result of attempts to rescue the
society from the perceived excesses of community leaders, traditional
authorities, oil companies or governments.”20 Self-determination themes
have been articulated, but mostly to strengthen bargaining positions of the
militias rather than demonstrating deep commitment to autonomy or seces-
sion. These themes, however, do appear to have a growing resonance with
the public, and sentiments for greater resource control are deeply popular
across all sectors of Niger Delta society. The group with the most media
savvy, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), has
promised to continue attacking oil installations and Nigerian military units
until the oil industry is under complete local control. MEND has advised all
foreigners to leave Nigeria altogether. Nigeria’s overall production of
petroleum is currently down by 25 percent as a result of violence perpe-
trated by MEND and other militias.
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The militias have also shown a disturbing trend of hiring themselves out
as mercenaries in other parts of Nigeria and Africa at large. Recent vio-
lence between two political kingpins in the Ogoni region of Rivers saw
militias hired from distant Delta state supporting one of the factions. The
U.S. Embassy in Abuja recently warned that some of these militias will be
hired for political muscle in the 2007 elections outside the Niger Delta.21
Pirates in Power
Primary responsibility for the crisis in the Niger Delta lies with the Nigerian
government itself, which clearly does not have a democratic mandate from
the peoples of the region. Elections in 1999 and 2003 across the Niger Delta
were blatantly rigged, with brazen ballot stuffing, tally altering, and out-
right thuggery in the presence of both local and international observers.22
European Union observers declared that elections across the region in 2003
lacked credibility, while local monitors were more frank, stating flatly that
there were no elections in much of the Niger Delta. As a result, opposition
parties were completely shut out of nearly all layers of government  and,
intimidated on the campaign trail, such that voters had no real political
choices and no alternatives for social action.
Not surprisingly, election victors — nearly all members of the ruling PDP
— have kept their loyalties firmly with the party barons that put them in
office, in true neopatrimonial fashion, rather than with the people they are
obligated to represent. One local activist summed up the situation: “We
approached our local government chairman to ask him to do something for
the community. He laughed at us and said, ‘Did you put me here?’”23
Much of the oil bunkering operations have strong ties to the political
elite. The militias typically provide security and cover for these operations;
the actual technical expertise to remove the oil and ship it to the interna-
tional market requires the complicity of an array of oil workers, military
officers, bureaucrats, politicians, international business contacts, and others
who profit from the trade. Local and international advocacy groups, such as
Human Rights Watch,  have noted that some of Nigeria’s most powerful
politicians are benefiting from the oil bunkering operations, and are the
likely kingpins controlling them.24
Civil society actors continue to spearhead a variety of peace initiatives
across the region, President Obasanjo has named two peace envoys: human
rights activist Fr. Matthew Kukah for the Ogoni dispute with oil giant Shell,
and more recently, journalist Ken Wiwa, son of slain Ogoni leader Ken
Saro-Wiwa, for the larger region as a whole. Both have made some
progress on the Ogoni conflict, although a final agreement for Shell to
reenter Ogoni lands is outstanding. President Obasanjo also recently prom-
ised a US$1.8 billion jobs and road-building project for the Niger Delta, but
leading militant groups have charged that the project is yet another source
for elites to score “bogus contracts.”
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Peace initiatives have had some impact on reducing the level of violence
in the region.  They have also succeeded in building some relationships
between militia leaders and government and civil society actors. Overall,
however, the fundamental drivers in the governance crisis remain unad-
dressed and stand to be further exacerbated as the 2007 elections approach.
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) remains deeply
beholden to the president and a host of powerful state politicians. It is mired
in a strategy of calculated incompetence reminiscent of 2003, in which
INEC’s incompetence provided opportunity for political parties to alter local
results. For instance, INEC recently announced that it had registered 61
million Nigerians (nearly 90 percent of all adults) in a highly flawed and
controversial voter registration exercise, yet in a recent poll covering all
thirty-six Nigerian states, 42 percent of respondents reported that they were
unable to register, suggesting that at least 20 million fraudulent voter cards
are in circulation. Fifty-four percent of Nigerians in that survey also said
they were afraid of becoming victims of election violence.25
More disturbingly, Nigerian democracy activists report that supporters
close to President Obasanjo are looking to scuttle the election — in part
through INEC complicity — in order to provide the president with sufficient
reason to extend his term in office, which, according to the constitution, will
end in May 2007. Election violence in the Niger Delta is central to these
tenure elongation scenarios, providing the president cause for declaring a
state of emergency that the National Assembly would be forced to ratify.
Politicians both within the PDP and in opposition as well as civil society
actors are moving to block this strategy, but even if the president’s support-
ers are unsuccessful, their efforts still undermine the election process.
Striking the Match
Although much of the Nigerian federation is struggling to democratize,
three of the states of the Niger Delta region — Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta
— are virtually failed states, while the rest of the region is not far behind.
The state governments have little presence outside their capitals, and local
governments are nonexistent except as depots for local patronage networks.
The Nigerian military has a growing presence in the region, but they are
increasingly outgunned by the Niger Delta militias, whose profits from oil
bunkering have allowed them to buy the most sophisticated modern weap-
onry. These include rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) and Man-
Portable Aid Defense Systems (“manpads”) — bought from international
arms dealers who brazenly pilot their ships right up to the Niger Delta
coast.
Impoverished inhabitants of the Niger Delta offer a textbook case in
frustration-aggression analysis. As expectations for improvements in stan-
dards of living — or in some perspectives, basic human needs — rise faster
than the political system can deliver, frustrations rise. When these frustra-
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tions reach a critical level, aggressive behaviors can result. If the govern-
ment appears openly antagonistic to public aspirations, revolt can occur.26
The fact that Nigeria earns billions of dollars in oil wealth every year
from Niger Delta oil is common knowledge across the region, as is the
abundant evidence that little of the earnings are being spent on socioeco-
nomic development there. Many of the current militia leaders tell that their
revolts were sparked by visits in the 1990s to Nigeria’s capital, Abuja,
where they saw massive public works and infrastructure development
bought with oil earnings, while their oil-producing communities continued to
languish with no jobs, no infrastructure, and an increasingly polluted envi-
ronment. Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, jailed leader of one of leading militias in
Rivers State with close ties to MEND, puts it plainly: “The thieves are the
people in Abuja. . . . A thief cannot come into my house, take my property,
sit down, because he is strong, and then turn back [to me] to say, oh, this is
the actual thief.”27
The people of the Niger Delta are not, however, a single unified polity. A
vast mosaic of ethnic divisions across the Niger Delta overlay these funda-
mental public frustrations over the lack of development and, more so, the
open government hostility to public aspirations for legitimate social change.
At least forty ethnic groups constituting over 20 million people speaking a
host of distinct languages and dialects inhabit the region, making regional
solidarity difficult and providing ample opportunities for divide-and-rule
tactics by government actors and oil companies. Obi notes that much of the
violence in the region “is impelled by horizontal struggles for oil and power
by rival factional interests, or communities, manipulating the history of
rights, entitlements, claims, and ownership.”28 The oil town of Warri in
Delta State has become particularly notorious for frequent bouts of violence
among resident Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urohobo ethnic communities over control
of local governments and oil producing areas, but the pattern of interethnic
strife repeats across the Niger Delta.
Numerous theories offer a variety of ways in which ethnic divisions can
contribute to social conflict. Social identity theory and interdependence
theories in social psychology focus on how members of groups bias in favor
of their own group (their so-called in-group), and how perceived threats
from out-groups can lead to strong negative reactions from group mem-
bers.29 Ethnic groups, as complex cultural units, serve such a rich variety of
fundamental identity, security, and community interests, particularly in the
context of failed-state conditions, the perceived threats from one ethnic
group against another can elicit strongly aggressive responses.
Although material frustration and aggravated ethnic differences provide
a conflict-prone context for the Niger Delta, the dysfunctional political
process is what exacerbates and transforms them into violent conflict.
Absent real elections in the Niger Delta, the communities have no legitimate
political representation in government. Instead, they are controlled by a
handful of powerful individuals from their communities engaged in
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neopatrimonial, personal patronage networks that owe their loyalties
upward — toward their immediate “godfathers” — not downward to the
people who are their constituents. Political leaders have little systemic
incentive to address the interests of the public in the region, since they do
not owe their offices to the electorate as a result of genuine public votes.
Politicians look only to take care of their immediate superiors and support-
ers in the neopatrimonial chain who provide local organization and political
muscle. In order to maintain their positions in a corrupt environment and
lacking legitimate business opportunities, politicians have every incentive to
steal public funds and oppress political opponents. Moreover, under this
arrangement politicians also have a strong incentive to impoverish commu-
nities and  fan ethnic resentments in order to keep them docile and afraid of
neighboring communities. Conflict maintains the status quo that benefits the
political monopoly of the elite.
Both in the National Assembly and at the president’s National Political
Reform Conference in 2005, political leaders from the Niger Delta pushed
strongly for increased “resource control.” They demanded an increase in
the percentage of oil wealth that is reserved for the region from 13 to 50
percent. No officeholder from the region has, however, inquired where the
allocated 13 percent has gone since the return to civilian rule in 1999, nor
have they investigated the president’s Niger Delta Development Commis-
sion, which has produced little demonstrable impact in the region. Instead,
they have spent their energies pushing the federal government to return
more oil revenues that are largely captured by neopatrimonial networks.
Oil companies also contribute to community disempowerment. The oil
industry knows full well its centrality to the functioning of the Nigerian
government, as well as the neopatrimonial politics that dominate. Since the
international outcry over Shell’s alleged complicity in the Nigerian military’s
hanging of Ogoni nationalist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995,30 Shell and the other
major multinationals have taken steps to increase the amount of develop-
ment aid they give to communities. Yet this aid is often selective and incon-
sistent, and sometimes leads to conflict among local communities over who
is to receive the funds. On other occasions village leaders accept the funding
and then abscond with it. Many communities complain that promised funds
often do not arrive, or that the companies do not follow through on local
agreements with them.
The companies, Chevron in particular, have also lent their helicopters and
equipment to the Nigerian military for operations to protect oil facilities
during which the military committed atrocities.31 One study has even found
that “the oil companies have also contributed significantly to the buildup of
armed groups in the Delta.”32 Shell itself admitted in 2004 that its business
practices had inadvertently contributed to conflict, poverty, and corruption
in the Niger Delta.33
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Time to Talk
Several fundamental structural problems must thus be addressed in the
Niger Delta if the current crisis is to be reversed:
• The people of the Niger Delta have no duly elected representation
at any level of Nigerian government, and thus have no formal
political voice.
• The Niger Delta produces the majority of Nigeria’s wealth, but still
enjoys only a fraction of its returns.
• The remaining wealth that does make it to the Niger Delta is, in
fact, substantial, but it is largely being stolen by the region’s own
political leaders and their supporters.
• The region’s deep ethnic diversity has been used by political leaders
to keep communities from organizing region-wide popular policy
platforms.
• Most of the oil bunkering networks are connected to powerful
national and local politicians, who have a financial interest in
continuing the crisis in the region.
• The rise of the militias is a direct result of massive unemployment
and lack of socioeconomic development across the region, as well as
a thriving West African arms market.
The April 2007 elections could bring these negative trends to an explosive
outcome, particularly if the president’s supporters are able to implement
their tenure extension plans. INEC’s calculated incompetence is also ex-
tremely worrying. If the president is not actively planning a chaotic elec-
tion, he is doing little to promote a credible process.
The election, however, marks an important opportunity for change in the
Niger Delta. Assuming that elections do indeed take place in April 2007, a
new government will take power with a real chance for a fresh start. Civil
society and other community actors need to prepare to take full advantage
of any initiative that the new government undertakes. The government will
have to demonstrate its credibility to the people of the Niger Delta very
quickly, as flawed elections will certainly increase public frustrations.
Timely action could halt the governance crisis in the Niger Delta and
mobilize the last best chance for sweeping change.  First, the Nigerian
government, joined by the major oil corporations, should begin talking with
affected communities. A region-wide Niger Delta conference, ideally hosted
by the new president, could be an important vehicle for such a dialogue.
Nearly every conflict resolution method begins with approaching the
antagonists in conflict so that they can articulate their interests and con-
cerns in regard to a dispute.34 As individuals present these interests, deeper
emotional needs are surfaced, thereby beginning a process of healing.35 Of
course, this process is fraught with uncertainty, but without the substantive
participation of the Niger Delta communities, no viable solution is possible.
The lack of substantive communication also feeds frustration-aggression
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and perspectives of ethnic grievance that create an increasingly dangerous
context, which irresponsible political actors can manipulate for their selfish
purposes.
By surfacing interests, community frustrations over the lack of local
benefits from the oil wealth can be articulated and plans for addressing
them developed. This step is essential, because legitimate community repre-
sentatives have yet to have the opportunity to say clearly what the commu-
nities want. Substantive talks also provide an essential vehicle for undermin-
ing the conflict potential of ethnic differences, as long as the process is open
and inclusive of all ethnic groups in the region.
Precisely because the communities have not been able to choose their own
representatives, the choice of who should be invited to join a dialogue with
the government and oil companies will be essential. With the April 2007
election in the Niger Delta promising to be as flawed as its predecessors,
many of the regional politicians will likely be as unrepresentative of the
communities as the current officeholders. These newly elected officials must
be invited but additional community representation will be required. Ethnic
organizations already proliferate across the region and  should be invited to
ensure that ethnic concerns are well articulated.
The communities themselves, however, still may have significant concerns
that will not be represented by the ethnic associations. Most villages in the
region have their own self-help associations — these community associa-
tions could be invited on a self-selecting basis. Government initiatives in the
past have tended to be exclusive affairs with participants chosen by the
president and governors, leading to predictable, status quo results. Any
community association, regardless how it defines its boundaries, should be
allowed to attend.
Once attendees join the region-wide conference, a series of open-member-
ship committees could be established on specific issues. The committees
would draft overarching recommendations for political reform and socio-
economic development.  Town-hall meetings across the Niger Delta could
be convened to discuss ideas and solicit public input. The goal of this pro-
cess would be not only to generate these recommendations, but to provide
the communities time and incentive to develop regional negotiating plat-
forms toward government actors and the corporations. Based on these
platforms, the new Nigerian president could lead a public process to address
the community-driven needs and to undertake the necessary package of
political reforms to improve future elections, governance, and social policy.
Political opposition must be allowed to operate freely within this process
and in the Niger Delta as a whole. Without functioning opposition parties,
there can be no institutional check on government, and the public has no
viable alternatives to better serve its interests. Consequently, the militias
become the de facto voice of the oppressed in the Niger Delta. Opposition
parties are also the most forceful advocates for clean elections and anticor-
ruption initiatives, since these help get them into power. If a semblance of
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credible elections can be restored, the opposition can begin to provide the
public with some political alternatives and undermine the attractiveness of
militant activity. Opinion polls in 2003 indicated that opposition parties in
the Niger Delta were doing well and likely to win at least three of the six
governorships in the region, not to mention state and federal legislative
seats.36
Beyond regional dialogue and respect for opposition, the new president
should undertake additional efforts to address the underlying sources of
conflict in the region. The regional conference may also have recommenda-
tions on these efforts, of which the president should take account. These
may include steps to
• Undertake efforts to disarm the militias through a sustainable
package of amnesty, weapons buyouts, job programs, and sensible
law enforcement initiatives.
• Demonstrate long-term government credibility by arresting the
national political kingpins who benefit from oil bunkering and
shutting down their personal empires. Current investigations by the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) of the six
governors of the Niger Delta region should provide credible evi-
dence to the public and identify all key players in their networks.
• Publish the full results of the 2005 NEITI audit of oil revenues, and
investigate disparities. Ensure that all oil companies have joined the
NEITI process and are fulfilling their obligations.
Oil companies should also support the public dialogue process, and
provide sufficient production and financing data to the participants. The
foreign companies are also in a unique position to be able to pay particular
attention to engaging women’s groups in the public dialogue, and ensuring
that they are regular participants in negotiations between oil companies and
the communities. The regional conference should also consider having the
companies end payments to the NDDC, and instead channel aid directly to
Niger Delta community associations, in a context of proper auditing proce-
dures and community oversight.
Companies that have not signed onto NEITI should be encouraged to do
so, and all should live up to their obligations under NEITI. Companies
should work harder to fulfill their contractual obligations with local commu-
nities. Direct financial assistance from oil corporations to the Nigerian
military and any indirect assistance through lending of equipment or hous-
ing should also be halted, as should any support for local militia activity.
Foreign governments can also press the Nigerian government to engage
in a substantive dialogue on these matters. Foreign donors can assist com-
munity associations and local civil society groups to join in the dialogue.
Foreign governments should also undertake more serious measures to block
the international access of oil bunkering networks to the global market. Part
of such efforts should include providing the Nigerian public with informa-
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tion on who are the international traders in stolen Nigerian oil, and who
within Nigeria is engaged in this trade.
These suggestions are only the broad contours of a strategy and policy to
stem the spiral of deadly violence in the Niger Delta. The essential element
is political restructuring of regional governance in line with the interests of
the communities of the Niger Delta, as the region-wide conference would
articulate those interests and send the communities an immediate message
that the government is serious about reforms that address their needs.
Leading presidential candidates have stressed the importance of dialogue
with the communities of the Niger Delta. President Obasanjo’s chosen
successor as presidential candidate for the ruling PDP, Umaru Yar’Adua,
listed the Niger Delta as one of his top priorities in his first major campaign
speech: “We will invest heavily on the resolution of Niger Delta crisis as
part of our security strategy, with focus on dialogue with the people.”37 Vice
President Abubakar Atiku, a leading opposition candidate, has promised a
“bottom-up strategy” that would have his government going directly to the
communities to ask what they needed.38 The other leading opposition
candidate, retired General Muhammadu Buhari, has not spoken directly of
dialogue with the residents of the Niger Delta, but has spoken extensively
on the need for rapid development: “What I believe is that if the leadership
. . . up to now had not abused public trust, the youths in the Niger Delta
would have no cause to be unhappy because there will be enough resources
for social services, schools, housing, roads and health.”39
Regardless of who takes the oath of office in May 2007 — and provided
that elections are held as scheduled — the new president will have a brief
and perhaps final opportunity to stem the growing conflict in the Niger
Delta and to set the region on the road to peace, equity, and development.
The rest of Nigeria has spent the last eight years moving haltingly forward,
without addressing problems in the oil-producing regions. Failed states,
however, tend to export their anarchy to their neighbors, and if the Niger
Delta is allowed to continue to burn unchecked, the rest of the fragile
Nigerian political house may soon ignite, imperiling the entire West African
region.
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